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Abstract 
I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization 
critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision 
maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent’s payoffs or beliefs and can 
only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions 
can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization 
problem under uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following: are there any testable implications 
of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU)? 
SEU is the theory that states that an agent chooses actions consistent with the maxi­
mization of the expectation of a utility function that depends on the action of the agent and 
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on the condition of the environment, and where the expectation is taken over the condi­
tion of the environment with respect to some probabilistic belief function. What is shown 
in this paper is that whether SEU has testable implications crucially depends on what is 
known by the analyst. In particular, if (i) the analyst does not know the preferences or 
the beliefs of the agent and (ii) the analyst can observe the sequence of actions over time 
chosen by the agent, then SEU has no testable implications. I show this by providing a 
SEU representation of a model of intertemporal behavior where the analyst does not know 
the preferences or the beliefs of the agent. The analyst, however, observes the sequence 
of actions chosen. In this setup any observed behavior can be viewed as the choice of an 
agent that maximizes expected utility for some utility function, discount factor, uncertainty 
space and prior belief. 
The intuition behind this result is that when choice over time depends on the evolution 
of a stock that is not known to us then we have enough degrees of freedom in our repre­
sentation of that stock to interpret any observed behavior as the solution to some problem 
of intertemporal choice. In the case of SEU, the “stock” is the belief held by the agent. If 
nothing is known about it, it can then be described by the analyst as that which justiﬁes 
whatever action the agent chose. That such a belief exists and is well-behaved from a prob­
abilistic standpoint arises from the fact that the uncertainty space over which it is deﬁned 
can also be picked arbitrarily. 
The result is not surprising upon reﬂection about what it says, and to many it is an insight 
that is known to the research community. Despite this, it is often argued that a departure 
from SEU is necessary in applications because the behavior it implies seems inconsistent 
with what agents do in the real world. This suggests the need to make the point clearly 
by presenting a stark, unambiguous case: one where complete ignorance about preferences 
and beliefs on the part of the analyst strips SEU of any predictive content. The result of 
this paper is therefore important because it provides a useful albeit extreme benchmark. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I present an example 
of the result. In Section 3, I introduce elements of the theory of statistical decisions. In 
Section 4, I present the result. Section 5 addresses robustness issues and Section 6 discusses 
the related literature. Section 7 concludes. 
2. A simple example 
Assume that the agent has two actions: to carry an umbrella around (a 1) or to leave
the umbrella home (a 2). The environment can take one of two conditions: it can either 
be sunny (S) or rainy  (R). The analyst observes the sequence {(at , yt )}∞ 1 of actions and t= 
1conditions of the environment over time, where (at , yt ) ∈ {a , a  2} × {S,R} := A × Y and 
knows nothing about the preferences or the beliefs of the agent. This sequence is the data 
to be rationalized. Deﬁne a 1–1 map between A and Y . This map can be arbitrary, but here 
I deﬁne one that is adapted to the interpretation suggested by the labels of the elements 
of A and Y : associate a 1 to R and a 2 to S. The utility function that rationalizes this data is 
based on this map, namely, u(a1,R)  = u(a2, S)  = 1 and u(a1, S)  = u(a2,R)  = 0. I now
turn to the construction of the belief function, which will depend on the evolution of at 
over time and on u. The important thing is that it need not depend at all on the evolution 
of yt . 
  
 
 
 
 
To build this function I adapt an idea used by Oakes (1985). Let v(yt+1 | ht ) be the 
probabilistic belief of the agent about the environment in period t + 1 given the history 
tht = {(aτ , yτ )} 1. Deﬁne v(yt+1 = S | ht ) = 3/4 when at+1 = a 2 and v(yt+1 = S | ht ) = τ= 
1/4 when at+1 = a 1. As a discount factor, pick ρ = 0. Notice that, period by period, this 
agent is choosing at , the myopic expected utility maximizing choice when the expectation 
is taken over yt with respect to the forecast v(yt | ht−1). The literature on learning in games 
(cf. Jordan, 1997, p. 154; Nyarko, 1997a, Proposition 7.1) shows that any agent who is 
best-responding to a prediction rule such as that given by v is, in fact, best responding to 
a subjective probability distribution on some large parameter space, which in this case we 
take to be equal to {S,R}∞. Hence the agent is a SEU maximizer (see also the discussion 
in Section 5). 
3. Statistical decision theory 
3.1. Actions, the environment 
Consider an agent facing an intertemporal choice problem under uncertainty. At each 
date t � 1, the agent chooses an action at ∈ A. After choosing at she observes the condition 
of the environment yt ∈ Y . The choice problem is being observed by an analyst who only 
sees the sequence {(at , yt )}∞ 1. It is therefore important to distinguish what is known by t= 
both the agent and analyst from what is known by the agent alone. The sets A and Y are 
the primitives of the problem that are given and known to both the agent and the analyst. 
Let A and Y be complete, compact, separable metric spaces with associated σ -ﬁelds A 
and Y , respectively. Assume that A has at least two elements and that Y has at least the 
cardinality of A. 
The set of histories of length T , HT , is the T -fold Cartesian product of A × Y . H0 
contains the single abstract element h0, the null history. The set of all (ﬁnite) histories 
is H = T �0 HT . The set of inﬁnite sequences of proﬁles (a, y) is denoted Z . Let the 
t th coordinate of z ∈ Z be zt and the ﬁrst t coordinates z(t). Let F denote the σ -ﬁeld of 
subsets of H derived from the Borel σ -ﬁelds on each HT . Let h ·h� be the concatenation of 
two histories h and h�. A  t -period history will be denoted by ht . A  strategy for the agent is 
a F -measurable function σ : H → A that for each history selects an element of A. Let Σ 
be the set of strategies of the agent. 
The derived elements of the problem that are given and known to both the agent and the 
analyst are, therefore, A, Y , HT (T = 0, 1, . . .),  H,F, Z and Σ . 
3.2. Payoffs, beliefs 
Given the agent’s choice and the condition of the environment she receives a reward, 
not observed by the analyst, according to a payoff function u : A × Y → �+. The agent 
monitors the condition of the environment according to a collection Θ (of models of 
the environment) and a prior probability distribution v deﬁned over Θ . Given one such 
model θ and a history h the agent has beliefs over the upcoming y given by the  map 
(h, θ) �→ η(· | h, θ) ∈ Δ(Y ). The interpretation is that the agent considers the condition of 
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the environment to be a process governed by one of the models in Θ , but is not sure exactly 
which (hence the prior probability distribution over Θ). Let u be measurable with respect 
to the product A ×Y and assume that Θ is a complete, separable metric space. 
The primitives of the problem that are given and known only by the agent are, therefore, 
u, Θ , v and η. 
It will be useful for what follows to derive from η the map (σ, θ) �→ pμ(· | σ, θ) ∈ Δ(Z), 
a probability distribution over the inﬁnite sequences in Z .1 This distribution, derived from 
the primitives known only to the agent, is consequently only known by the agent. 
4. Arbitrary Bayesian rational behavior 
A strategy σ is consistent with a given sequence {(at , yt )}∞ 1 if σ(h0) = a1 and for all t= 
t � 1, σ(a1, y1, . . . , at , yt ) = at+1. A payoff function u : A × Y → �+ is nontrivial if 
there are actions a , a �� and a condition of the environment y such that u(a�, y)  =� u(a��, y). 
The main result can thus be stated as follows: 
∗Theorem 1. For every sequence {(at , y  ∗ )}∞ 1 ∈Z there are a complete, separable metric t t=
space Θ , a prior v ∈ Δ(Θ), a probability function η, a nontrivial utility function u, a dis­
∗count factor ρ and a strategy σ ∗ consistent with {(a ∗ , y  )}∞ 1 such that t t t= 
� �  ∞ 
σ ∗ ∈ arg sup ρt−1u(zt )pη(dz | σ, θ)v(dθ). 
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t=1Θ Z 
Proof. Let f : A → Y be a 1–1 measurable function.2 Deﬁne u(a, y) = 1 if  y = f (a)  and 
u(a, y) = 0 otherwise. Then, there is a map aˆ �→ μ ˆ ∈ Δ(Y ) such that, for every action a
aˆ ∈ A, aˆ ∈ arg maxa∈A u(a, y)μ ˆ (dy).3 Y a 
Let Θ = Y∞; for every θ = (y1, y2, . . .)  and ht = (a1, y1, . . . , at , yt ) let η(· | ht , θ)  = 
yt+1. By Kolmogorov’s extension theorem the prior v on Θ can be chosen so that 
v1 :=margY1 v = μ ∗ and = margYt+1 v(· | y1, . . . , yt ) = μ ∗ for every ﬁnite se­a vt+1 a1 t+1 
quence (y1, . . . , yt ). 
Deﬁne σ ∗ as follows: for all t � 0 and all ht belonging to a measurable subset of Ht , ∗ σ ∗ (ht ) = at+1. Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then σ ∗ maximizes SEU as required. 
1 The derivation of pμ(· | σ, θ) is as follows: First, deﬁne pμ recursively for every history h ∈H. Let pμ(h0 |
σ, θ) = 1 and pμ(h · (a, y) | σ, θ) = pμ(h | σ, θ) × σ(a  | h) × μθ (a | h). Second, deﬁne the cylinders C(h) to be 
the set of paths of play z for which z(t) = h, where h belongs to a measurable subset of Ht . Third, deﬁne pμ 
over C(h) to be equal to pμ(h | σ, θ). This probability measure is then uniquely extended by continuity from the 
cylinders to the σ -ﬁeld on Z generated by the cylinders. 
2 The existence of this function follows from the fact that A has cardinality of at least two, Y has cardinality at 
least A and these sets are complete, separable metric spaces.
3 Notice that the distribution μ ˆ can be chosen so that it has full support on Y . For example, μ ˆ = (1 −a a 
ε)δf (aˆ) + εμ, where μ has full support and ε >  0 is sufﬁciently small. 
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To see this notice that with the structure at hand the problem can be rewritten as 
� ∞ 
ρt−1sup u σ  (ht−1), θt v(dθ), 
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t=1Θ �∞which in turn leads to supσ ∈Σ 1 ρt−1 � u(σ (ht−1), y) vt (dy). To show that σ ∗ solves t= Y 
this problem it sufﬁces (due to the one-shot deviation principle) to check that, given any 
partial history hT , there is no expected proﬁtable deviation from σ ∗ (hT ) at date T + 1. ∗	 TRecall that σ ∗ (hT ) = aT +1 and notice that vt is independent of {aτ } 1 for t � T + 1.τ= 
Hence, the problem at date T + 1 is to choose aT +1 ∈ A to maximize 
�	 ∞ � 
∗ ρT u(aT +1, y)vT +1(dy) + ρt−1 u σ  (ht−1, y  vt (dy). (1) 
t=T +2Y	 Y 
By construction, the ﬁrst term in the summation is maximized by σ ∗ (hT ). � 
5. Robustness issues 
It is interesting to ponder whether the result holds as we add assumptions about what 
the analyst knows. For example, suppose the analyst knew the shape of the distribution η, 
and the parameter space Θ the agent used to represent the uncertainty about the evolution 
of yt . Will this invalidate the result? The answer to this question is: not necessarily, as the 
examples below demonstrate. 
•	 Consider the case presented in Section 2 and assume that the analyst observes 
{(at , yt )}∞ 1, and knows the map η, and the parameter space Θ . The analyst may know t= 
the pair (η, Θ), but nothing is gained if Θ just happened to be {S,R}∞ and the agent’s 
beliefs about yt a convex combination of Dirac measures. Then, as Section 2 shows, 
any behavior can be rationalized as SEU maximization. 
•	 Consider now the case presented in Section 2 but assume this time that the analyst 
observes {(at , yt )}∞ 1, and that the agent knows that the sequence yt is exchangeable t= 
with respect to the agent’s prior v. Then, by de Finetti’s theorem, with v-probability 
one, the empirical distribution of yt converges together with the player’s posterior 
over yt+1 to some probability measure (μ ∗ , 1 − μ ∗ ) over {R, S}. Will this invalidate 
the result of this paper? 
The answer to this question, again, is: not necessarily. For example, consistent with 
the information given above is the representation with Θ = {θ}, μ = (μ ∗ , 1 −μ ∗ ) and 
v = 1θ . This representation, together with the discount factor δ = 0 and the utility ∗function u(a1,R)  = 1, u(a1, S)  = u(a2,R)  = μ , u(a2,R)  = 2μ ∗, rationalizes the 
given sequence {(at , yt )}∞ 1. t= •	 The examples above, when combined, suggest conditions under which the result no 
longer holds. Consider once more the setup in Section 2 as in the example above when 
the analyst knew that the agent considered the sequence yt to be exchangeable. This 
time the analyst also knows that the agent’s representation of the uncertainty over yt 
 is given by μ over {R,S} with Θ = [0,1] for some non-singular prior v over Θ . 
Exchangeability implies that posterior beliefs are, in the limit, constrained by the 
realization of θ , which means that the utility function that rationalizes a particular 
∞sequence {(at , yt )} 1, cannot be independent of θ . As a consequence, there is no state t= ∞independent utility function that rationalizes {(at , yt )} 1 in this case. t= 
6. Related literature 
In one of the ﬁrst attempts to understand the restrictions imposed by SEU, Pearce (1984) 
showed that when the analyst knows the agent’s preferences over mixtures of actions 
SEU rules out players choosing strictly dominated strategies. Ledyard (1986) and Börg­
ers (1993) assume that only preferences over pure strategy outcomes are observable, and 
show that, as in Pearce (1984), a notion of domination carries the testable content of SEU. 
Blume and Easley (1998) and Nyarko (1997b) have shown that, given an observable proﬁle 
of utility functions any stochastic process of undominated actions can be the outcome of 
a model of intertemporal optimization and Bayesian learning. Nyarko (1997b) considers 
the zero discount factor case while Blume and Easley (1998) consider the more general 
case. From the methodological standpoint, Blume and Easley (1998) can be thought of as 
a direct precursor of the present work. 
Lo (2000) shows that if one is restricted to the observation of only one choice from 
a ﬁnite set of acts, the subjective expected utility model is observationally indistinguish­
able from all models of preference that satisfy Savage’s axiom P3, which is a form of 
monotonicity. Epstein (2000) points to the need for the analyst to observe choices from at 
least two different sets of choices where the agent has the same belief if one is to be able 
to refute SEU. Border (1992) assumes that the analyst is able to observe the entire choice 
function of the agent and shows that any choice function consistent with SEU must not be 
stochastically dominated. 
Another closely related paper is that of Green and Park (1996), which asks whether a 
strategy can be rationalized by maximization of conditional state dependent utility. They
identify a necessary and sufﬁcient condition, in an environment with a correctly speciﬁed 
prior, for a strategy to be rationalizable. Their condition requires for a plan not to react to 
“irrelevant” information. It is a very weak condition. 
7. Conclusions 
The present paper contributes to the literature associated with how little restrictions the 
assumptions of rationality impose on individual and collective behavior by showing that 
when the analyst knows nothing about the preferences or beliefs of an agent any sequence 
of actions observed by the analyst can be the outcome of some model of intertemporal 
optimization and Bayesian learning. 
Not all predictive content of SEU is lost in practice, however, because auxiliary assump­
tions about what is known to the analyst can be made which, jointly with observability of 
actions and SEU, generate testable implications. In this sense, the result presented in this 
paper is an instance of a principle known to modern philosophers of science: that no core 
set of theoretical assumptions can be contradicted in isolation (Caldwell, 1982, Chapter 4). 
References 
Blume, L., Easley, D., 1998. Rational expectations and rational learning. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Organizations 
with Incomplete Information. Cambridge Univ. Press., Cambridge, pp. 61–109. 
Border, K., 1992. Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis. J. Econ. The­
ory 56, 20–42. 
Börgers, T., 1993. Pure strategy dominance. Econometrica 61, 423–430. 
Caldwell, B., 1982. Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century. Allen & Unwin, Lon­
don. 
Epstein, L., 2000. Are probabilities used in markets? J. Econ. Theory 91, 86–90. 
Green, E., Park, I., 1996. Bayes contingent plans. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 31, 225–236. 
Jordan, J., 1997. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective. In: Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., Skyrms, B. 
(Eds.), The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 149–174. 
Ledyard, J., 1986. The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory 39, 59–82. 
Lo, K., 2000. Rationalizability and the Savage axioms. Econ. Theory 15, 727–733. 
Nyarko, Y., 1997a. Savage–Bayesian agents play a repeated game. In: Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., Skyrms, B. (Eds.), 
The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 175–197. 
Nyarko, Y., 1997b. Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 74, 
266–296. 
Oakes, D., 1985. Self-calibrating priors do not exist. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 80, 339. 
Pearce, D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica 52, 1029–1050. 
